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1 Introduction
Since the 80s, the telecommunications sector has been largely shaped by a
set of market reforms which have been applied worldwide. These reforms in-
cluded the liberalization of the telecommunications sector, namely the open-
ing to competition of fixed and cellular segments often coupled with the
privatization of the fixed-line traditional operator. These changes were typ-
ically accompanied by the creation of regulatory agencies independent from
political power in a sector where regulation and competition policy were
playing an increasingly important role in the functioning of the market.
Building over more than two decades of experience, the outcome of pri-
vatization across different regions raises an important question: Should this
reform apply equally to countries at different stages of development in the
telecommunications sector and in the overall economy? Arguably, the suc-
cess of privatization is contingent on private investors’ perception of local
conditions. For example, investors face divergent incentives in OECD coun-
tries characterized by excess supply and in non-OECD countries where excess
demand was the norm.
Various factors influence private investors’ decision to enter the market.
Relevant determinants of investment priorities are measures of wealth, popu-
lation distribution, geographical location, political accountability and risk, as
well as the status of the telecommunications sector. Through these lens, there
are systematic differences between regions, OECD countries being the most
attractive locations followed by Latin American and Caribbean countries and
subsequently by African countries. Among African countries, resource-scarce
landlocked economies obtain by large the worst scores.
In this research, we perform an empirical analysis of the impact of pri-
vatization of fixed-line operators on network growth, tariffs, and efficiency
with the purpose of highlighting any important differences when examining
OECD countries, Latin American and Caribbean countries, African resource
rich countries, African resource scarce coastal countries and African resource
scarce landlocked countries. The main motivation for this work is to bring
some new insights to the debate on the impact of privatization of fixed-line
operators on the telecommunications sector.
The empirical literature has produced divergent results on the outcome
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of privatization of fixed-line networks. We attempt to explain this divergence
by the fact that studies use either disaggregated data (on a specific country
or region) or very aggregated data (worldwide data sets). In this study, we
use comparable data sets on a large number of countries which allows us to
recover most of the results in the literature. The main policy implication
is that the outcomes of a privatization reform are to a large extent sector-
dependent and remain strongly affected by the specific country-conditions
where it is applied.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section summarizes some
of the empirical results recently put forward in the literature on the impact
of the privatization of fixed-line operators on telecommunications outcomes.
This section is not meant to be exhaustive but rather to serve the purpose of
arguing that there is a need to analyze the impact of privatization in a more
disaggregated manner and across a sufficiently large number of countries and
regions.
Section 3 describes the basic econometric ingredients that constitute the
elements of the empirical methodology we use to analyze the data sets on
23 OECD countries and 85 non-OECD countries covering the period 1985-
2007. In section 4, we discuss the results of a preliminary analysis of these
data and of the fixed-effect and random-effect estimations of the impact of
privatization. Section 5 summarizes our empirical findings and discusses
some policy implications. A detailed description of the data used, their
sources, data statistics and estimations are given in the appendix.
2 The impact of privatization - What do we
know?
The availability of data accumulated over more than two decades on the
telecommunications sector has enabled the emergence of a relatively large
empirical literature that analyzes the impact of major market reforms on in-
frastructure deployment in this sector. We briefly review some representative
studies in this stream of literature with a special focus on the privatization
reform and indicate the contribution of our paper.
Most of the studies on the impact of sectoral reforms on infrastructure
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deployment in non-OECD countries acknowledge that overall there exists a
robust relationship between some variables representing the reforms and some
variables measuring telecommunications network expansion such as fixed-
line penetration. In particular, the bulk of this literature has come to the
conclusion that the introduction of competition has resulted in measurable
improvements on network deployment and labor efficiency in the fixed-line
segment (see McNary, 2001, Fink et al, 2002, Wallsten, 2001, Gutierrez, 2003,
Ros, 1999, 2003 and Li and Xu, 2004).
There is no such a consensus on the impact of the privatization of the
fixed-line traditional operator on network expansion. Some empirical results
indicate that this policy has a positive impact on fixed-line deployment. After
controlling for tariff re-balancing, Banerjee and Ros (2000) find that priva-
tization reduces unmet demand by approximately 28% in a data set on 23
Latin American countries for the period 1986-1995. Gutierrez (2003) reports
a reduction of unmet demand of the order of 10 to 18% in data on 22 Latin
American countries covering the period 1980-1997. Similar results are ob-
tained by Fink et al. (2002), Ros (2003), and Li and Xu (2004) using large
data sets.1
However, other empirical studies using worldwide data sets, in particular
Ros (1999) and McNary (2001), indicate that privatization has a null or even
a negative impact on fixed-line deployment.2 Nevertheless, both authors in-
sist on the role played in the privatization process by regulators independent
from political power, feature that neither of them include in their analyses.
The importance of this matter is highlighted by Wallsten (2001) and Gutier-
rez (2003) who find that privatization coupled with the existence of an inde-
pendent regulator results in larger gains in terms of network expansion. Fink
et al. (2002) and Ros (2003) also find that the impact of privatization and
competition reforms is enhanced by the creation of a separate regulator. As
to the impact of privatization on efficiency, evidence suggests that it is sim-
1Fink et al (2002) provide an analysis of the impact of privatization of the fixed-line
traditional operator on fixed-line deployment and labor efficiency in data on 86 developing
countries across African, Asian, Middle Eastern, Latin American and Caribbean countries
for the period 1985-1999. Ros (2003) and Li and Xu (2004) use Latin American and
worldwide data, respectively.
2For an analysis of privatization policies across the world see Bortolotti and Siniscalco
(2004).
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ilarly affected by the presence of an independent regulator (Wallsten, 2001
and Gutierrez, 2003).3
In this study, we seek to contribute to the debate on the impact of the pri-
vatization of the fixed-line operator on telecommunications outcomes with an
econometric analysis that attempts to explain the divergent results in the em-
pirical literature. Our analysis tests the conjecture that the different results
in the literature on the performance of privatization of fixed-line operators
can be explained to a large extent by cross-regional heterogeneity.
The privatization reform should yield different outcomes in OECD and
non-OECD countries where the former are characterized by excess supply of
telecommunications services and the latter by excess demand. Non-OECD
countries are also largely heterogenous in the factors characterizing their
telecommunications sector and their economies as a whole. For example,
when privatization reforms started African networks were extremely small,
lagging behind their counterparts in Latin America and the Caribbean. At-
tracting private investment was likely to be more difficult for African coun-
tries.
There are also significant differences among African countries. African
resource rich countries engage to a lesser extent in market reforms than other
countries in Africa. They can rely on natural resources for their development
and hold a stronger independence from policies advocated by International
Financial Institutions (IFIs). In contrast, African resource scarce coastal
economies contribute to the trade flows of some commodities and services
and are therefore likely to adopt international practices.
African resource scarce landlocked countries are those that are worst-
off in Africa. These countries’ economies are characterized by the lack of
natural resources, the geographical isolation from international trade flows
and the strong dependence on coastal neighbors’ policies, particularly when
it comes to the building and maintenance of regional infrastructure networks.
Different countries offer hence different incentives to private investors.
3There is evidence that some details of the private transactions also play an important
role on network deployment. See Wallsten (2000) and Li and Xu (2004) for the effects of
exclusivity periods and Ros (2003) for the effects of the price cap regulatory regime.
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3 Data and econometric specification
In this section, we first describe the data set on 108 countries that we con-
structed and the basic ingredients of the econometric methodology used to
analyze them.
3.1 Data
We have constructed a time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) data set containing
time-varying information on 108 countries for the period 1985-2007.4 These
data have been organized in variables regrouped in five categories, namely,
“telecommunications outcomes,” “telecommunications reforms,” “political
and risk indices,” and “other variables.” The list of the countries included
in the data set, the definition of each of the variables, the data sources and
some standard summary statistics are given in the appendix.
We classify the sample in 23 OECD countries and 85 non-OECD coun-
tries. In the non-OECD group we include 23 countries from Latin America
and the Caribbean, 43 from Africa, 6 from Middle East and 11 from Asia
and the Pacific. In the African sample we further classify countries according
to their resources and geographical characteristics with 15 resource rich, 16
resource scarce coastal and 13 resource scarce landlocked (see Table A1 in
the appendix).
Telecommunications outcomes are measured by the level of output (main-
line penetration or cellular subscription), efficiency (mainlines per employee),
or price (fixed residential, cellular). Telecommunications reforms are repre-
sented by variables that give the number of competitors in the analogue and
digital cellular segments, whether a separate telecommunications regulator
has been created and a variable that measures whether some percentage of
the fixed-line incumbent’s assets have been sold to private investors.5
The political and risk indices indicate the degree of accountability in
the government, as well as political, financial and economic risk valuations
4Our panel includes countries that have reformed their telecommunications sector and
countries that have not. Hence, selectivity bias should not be a concern in our data set.
5We do not include competition in the local segment of the fixed-line market. Even
though this segment has historically constituted a bottleneck, Gasmi and Recuero Virto
(2009) do not find a significant correlation between its opening to competition and the
outcome variables considered here.
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that are relevant to investment choices and ultimately to sector outcomes.
Variables under the heading of “other variables” are those that measure some
demand and supply factors that are deemed relevant for our estimation of
the impact of privatization such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per
capita and the percentage of rural population. Under this classification, we
also include dummy variables that identify African as resource rich, resource
scarce coastal and resource scarce landlocked.
3.2 Econometric model
To investigate the impact of the privatization reform on telecommunications
outcomes, we run a set of regressions with the dependent variable represent-
ing a measure of deployment, prices or efficiency. The explanatory variables
have been chosen to allow us to test the impact of privatization, while control-
ling for other features that may have played a major role in the determination
of the outcomes in the telecommunications sector.
Given the type of our data which are TSCS, we choose to apply fixed-
effect and random-effect models. Fixed-effect models allow to control for fixed
unobserved heterogeneity and are therefore preferred to random models when
estimating the relationship between privatization and telecommunications
outcomes.6 Time dummies are included when the model’s goodness-of-fit
improves with the presence of these variables.7
We specify the following model:
yit = α0 + x
′
itβ + ²it (1)
where i = 1, 2, . . . , N , t = 1, 2, . . . , T , yit is a one-dimensional variable rep-
resenting the continuous dependent variable (fixed-line deployment, cellular
deployment, labor efficiency, price of fixed-line and price cellular), α0 is a
scalar parameter, xit is a vector of regressors, β is the associated vector of
parameters and ²it is a disturbance term. xit includes the privatization of
6Indeed, Wald tests confirm the presence of fixed-effects.
7Testing for the presence of time-specific effects seems particularly relevant in our
context since some important events have occurred during the period under study. These
events include, among others, the 1995 “Tequila” crisis, the 1997 South-asian crisis, the
1998-1999 financial breakdown and some events related to technological progress such as
the introduction of digital system.
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the fixed-line operator, but also other explanatory variables such as the de-
gree of competition in the cellular market, the creation of an independent
regulator, political, economic and financial risks, the degree of democratic
accountability and measures of wealth and population distribution.
In order to account for dynamics in our data, we make use of the Differ-
enced Generalized Method of Moments (DIF-GMM) developed by Arellano
and Bover (1995) for analyzing panel data and applied by Beck and Katz
(2004) to TSCS data. However, fixed and random models systematically
outperform these dynamic regressions.8
To take care of endogeneity problems which seem likely to arise in the
estimation of equation (1), we set a procedure to find appropriate instru-
ments using the DIF-GMM (see Gasmi et al., 2009). Endogeneity can be
indeed an issue in our context. For example, the government might raise
efficiency prior to engaging in privatization to increase the probability of at-
tracting investors. One can also argue that the government might decide to
privatize because the number of fixed-lines is extremely low. However, these
endogenous regressions were systematically outperformed by fixed-effect and
random-effect models.9
4 Impact of privatization
4.1 Preliminary analysis
In this section we explore some basic statistics of our data set. First, we
compare across regions the statistics on explanatory and dependent vari-
ables from Tables A2-A8 in the appendix. The most relevant information
is summarized in Table 1 below. Then, we analyze the correlations between
the privatization variable and those variables capturing telecommunications
outcomes.
By taking a close look at Tables A2-A8 in the appendix, we can see that
regions can be classified according to some explanatory variables that mea-
sure wealth, population distribution, political accountability, risk and the
status of the telecommunications sector. Both OECD and Latin American
8Results are available from the authors upon request.
9Results are available from the authors upon request.
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and Caribbean countries are characterized by having a high percentage of
the population in urban areas (74.8% and 61.4%, respectively). Otherwise,
OECD countries are outperforming their Latin America and Caribbean coun-
terparts in the level of GDP per capita, the economic and financial risks, the
degree of democratic accountability and the openness of the telecommunica-
tions sector as measured by the creation of independent regulators and the
degree of competition in the cellular market.
African countries are systematically outperformed by Latin American and
Caribbean countries. If we disaggregate further, African resource rich and
resource scarce coastal countries share similar characteristics in terms of the
level of GDP per capita, the share of population living in urban areas (around
40%) and the economic and financial risks. African resource scarce coastal
countries perform nevertheless better in the political risks and the degree
of democratic accountability and show higher liberalization trends in the
telecommunications sector.
Africa resource scarce landlocked countries differ substantially from the
rest of the countries in our sample with a level of GDP per capita that falls
to less than a quarter of the African average, a share of rural population that
attains 80%, the worst indicators in financial, economic and political risks as
well as the lowest degree of democratic accountability. These countries have
nevertheless a more liberalized telecommunications sector than resource rich
countries.
These data are consistent with Bates et al. (2008) where African re-
source scarce landlocked countries are particularly prone to state breakdown
with the government being unable to maintain internal security. These coun-
tries are also the most exposed in Africa to anti-growth syndromes. On the
other hand, the telecommunications sector is more liberalized in resource
scarce coastal than in resource scarce landlocked countries since the returns
to market-oriented policies are higher in the former (Gallup et al., 1999).
In Table 1 below, we can see the average over the period under study
of the variables of interest to us, namely, privatization of the fixed-line
incumbent(priva) and telecommunications outcomes: mainline penetration
(ml), cellular subscription (cel), mainlines per employee (eff), monthly sub-
scription to fixed (p res) and price of cellular (p cel). In OECD countries,
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Table 1
Privatization and outcomes
priva ml cel eff p res p cel
OECD 0.6 49.9 35.3 181.8 19.9 1.3
Non-OECD 0.3 6.1 7.6 66.7 8.2 0.8
Latin America & Caribbean 0.4 11.4 11.0 102.7 8.4 1.1
Africa 0.3 2.5 4.8 40.6 8.3 0.8
-Resource rich 0.3 2.2 5.5 40.1 6.5 0.8
-Resource scarce coastal 0.3 4.3 6.9 51.1 7.9 0.7
-Resource scarce landlocked 0.1 0.51 1.2 25.9 10.4 0.9
60% of the fixed-line operators are at least partly privatized, twice as much
as in non-OECD countries. The levels of telecommunications outcomes in
terms of deployment and labor efficiency are largely above those of non-
OECD countries as well. Prices of fixed-line and cellular are also above those
of non-OECD countries.
Concerning non-OECD countries, Latin America and the Caribbean, African
resource rich and African resource scarce coastal countries have privatized
between 30-40% of the fixed-line operators. This number falls to 10% in
African resource scarce landlocked countries. Regarding outcomes, Latin
America and the Caribbean countries are ahead of their African counterparts
in fixed-line and cellular deployment and in labor efficiency. In particular,
they perform in these measures twice as better as African resource rich and
African resource scarce coastal countries and over four times better than
African resource scarce landlocked countries.
In Table A9, we can see the correlation coefficients between privatization
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of the fixed-line operator and the variables capturing telecommunications
outcomes. This correlation is the strongest between privatization and cellular
deployment, which suggests complementarities between fixed-line and cellular
sectors. The correlation is also very strong and positive between privatization
and labor efficiency in the fixed-line.
The relationship between privatization and fixed-line prices and fixed-line
deployment is not very strong. In particular, there exists a positive correla-
tion between privatization and fixed-line prices for Latin American and the
Caribbean and African resource rich countries, and between privatization
and fixed-line deployment for African resource rich countries. The positive
(although weak) correlation between privatization and fixed-line prices is con-
sistent with the re-balancing of tariffs that usually accompanies this reform
in a sector characterized by urban vs rural and international and long vs
local distance cross-subsidies in calls. The correlation is the weakest between
privatization and cellular prices although it is systematically negative for all
regions due to the competition pressure.
The preliminary analysis of the data sets the ground for a scrutiny of
the relationship between the privatization reform and telecommunications
outcomes in the samples on OECD and non-OECD countries. This light-
handed checkup of the data has led us to conclude that there are reasons to
identify different regions. The next step then has been to search in the data
for evidence of a relationship between the privatization reform and telecom-
munications outcomes by means of correlation tests. These tests have also
shown that such a relationship might exist and that it is stronger for cellular
deployment and labor efficiency in the fixed-line. We also find that the corre-
lation between privatization and outcomes is particularly strong for African
resource rich countries.
4.2 Regression results
In this section, we address the existence of relationships between the priva-
tization of the fixed-line and the telecommunications outcomes by running
a set of regressions. Tables A10-A19 in the appendix show the fixed-effect
and random-effect estimation results on which we build our testing proce-
dure asking whether the variable of privatization (priva), has a significant
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impact on the variables of telecommunications outcomes, namely, mainline
penetration (ml), cellular subscription (cel), mainlines per employee (eff),
monthly subscription to fixed (p res), and price of cellular (p cel).
We also include in our estimations some control variables. Those in-
clude telecommunications reforms, namely, cellular competition (comp cel)
and the creation of a separate regulator (reg), political and risk indices,
namely, democratic accountability (demo), political risk (p risk), financial
risk (f risk) and economic risk (e risk), other variables, namely, rural pop-
ulation (rural) and GDP per capita (gdp) and a constant (const). The
estimates shown in these tables are those of the parameters of equation (1).
In line with the inspection of simple statistics in the preliminary analysis,
we identify the following regions for our analysis: OECD (Tables A10-A11),
non-OECD (Tables A12-A13), Latin America and the Caribbean (Tables
A14-A15), Africa (Tables A16-A17) and Africa resource rich, Africa resource
scarce coastal and Africa resource scarce landlocked (Tables A18-A19).
In addition to showing the estimated values of the parameters associated
with the explanatory variables listed at the left, Tables A10-A19 include
three additional items. Firstly, we show whether time dummies are included
or not in the regression under Time.10 Secondly, we provide an F-statistic
(F ) for fixed-effects or Wald statistic (Wald) for random-effects for testing
the joint significance of the explanatory variables. Thirdly, we include the
number of observations included in each regression (Obs.).
In Tables 2 and 3 below, we can see the results of the estimations in Tables
A10-A19 summarized for the relationships of interest. By comparing these
two tables, we see that results are fairly similar for the fixed and random-
effects models. The least one can say about the results obtained with the data
on OECD countries is that they do not convey the same messages as non-
OECD countries. The impact of privatization of the fixed-line operator in
OECD countries is only significantly (and positively) correlated with labor
efficiency in the fixed-line. The non significant impact of privatization on
fixed-line deployment is consistent with the fact that when this reform was
introduced in OECD countries, they had already well supplied markets.
In non-OECD countries the impact of privatization is instead strongly
10The inclusion of time dummies is done consistently with the value of a Wald statistic
for testing the joint significance of time-specific effects.
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Table 2
Impact of privatization on outcomes: Fixed-effects
Privatization ml cel eff p res p cel
OECD NS NS + (∗) NS NS
Non-OECD NS NS NS + (∗∗∗) NS
Latin America and the Caribbean NS NS NS NS NS
Africa - (∗∗∗) + (∗∗∗) - (∗∗) + (∗∗∗) NS
Africa resource rich - (∗∗∗) + (∗∗∗) - (∗∗∗) + (∗) NS
Africa resource scarce coastal NS + (∗∗∗) + (∗∗∗) + (∗∗∗) NS
Africa resource scarce landlocked NS - (∗∗∗) - (∗∗) NS NS
Note: NS stands for non-significant. + and - reflects that the impact is significant and
the sign. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ stands for significance at the 10%/5%/1%.
and positively correlated with the price of fixed-line. This is consistent with
the fact that when privatization started in these countries, most had not im-
plemented tariff re-balancing and were still working under cross-subsidization
schemes between urban and rural consumers and between international, long
distance and local calls. For instance, prices of fixed-line were historically
kept below cost for local communications which were subsidized by long dis-
tance and international calls.
In non-OECD countries privatization is also positively correlated with
cellular deployment, though to the impact is weak. This suggests some degree
of complementarity between privatization of the fixed-line operator and the
number of cellular subscribers. In Tables 1 and 2 however, we can see that
privatization of the fixed-line has not translated into a significant increase
in fixed-line deployment nor in fixed-line efficiency. Hence, the increase in
residential prices of fixed-line in non-OECD countries with the arrival of
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Table 3
Impact of privatization on outcomes: Random-effects
Privatization ml cel eff p res p cel
OECD NS NS + (∗∗∗) NS NS
Non-OECD NS + (∗) NS + (∗∗∗) NS
Latin America and the Caribbean NS - (∗) + (∗∗) + (∗∗) NS
Africa - (∗∗∗) + (∗∗∗) - (∗∗∗) + (∗∗∗) NS
Africa resource rich - (∗∗∗) + (∗∗∗) - (∗∗∗) + (∗∗) NS
Africa resource scarce coastal NS + (∗∗∗) + (∗∗∗) + (∗∗∗) NS
Africa resource scarce landlocked NS - (∗∗∗) - (∗∗∗) NS NS
Note: NS stands for non-significant. + and - reflects that the impact is significant and
the sign. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ stands for significance at the 10%/5%/1%.
privatization have not resulted into larger penetration or efficiency in the
fixed-line.
Non-OECD countries are nevertheless strongly heterogenous when an-
alyzed more in detail. From a joint look at the fixed and random-effect
estimation results, we can derive the following conclusions for Latin Amer-
ican and the Caribbean and African regions. The impact of privatization
in Latin American and the Caribbean countries is weaker than in Africa.
Indeed, none of the privatization variables are significant in the fixed-effect
estimations of Latin America and the Caribbean as we can see in Table 1.
The results also suggest that the impact of privatization of the fixed-
line operator on outcomes in the fixed-line sector are strongly negative in
our sample of African countries while weakly positive in Latin American
and the Caribbean countries. Indeed, with the data on African countries
privatization of the fixed-line operator is strongly and negatively correlated
with fixed-line deployment and labor efficiency. Instead, with the data on
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Latin American and the Caribbean countries there is a weak and positive
relationship between privatization and fixed-line labor efficiency.
Another difference between African and Latin American and the Caribbean
samples, is that in that former we can observe that the privatization of the
fixed-line operator and cellular deployment are strongly and positively asso-
ciated while the later show some weak negative correlation. Hence, we find
that privatization and cellular penetration are strongly complementary in
Africa while these variables are weak substitutes in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
There are also some similarities between the results with Latin American
and the Caribbean and African samples. Privatization has not resulted in
growth of fixed-line penetration rates in either region. Moreover, in both
regions there is a positive relationship between privatization and fixed-line
prices, which is particularly strong in Africa. In addition, neither in Latin
American and the Caribbean nor in African countries, privatization is signif-
icantly correlated with prices in the cellular sector. While private operators
often justify increases in prices of fixed-line to raise investment, increases in
residential tariffs in our data set did not translate into larger deployment.
In Tables 1 and 2 we can also observe significant differences between
Africa countries when analyzed according to their natural endowments and
geographical location. The impact of privatization of the fixed-line operator
on outcomes in the fixed-line sector is strongly negative in our sample of
African resource rich and resource scarce landlocked countries while positive
in African resource scarce coastal countries. In resource rich countries, priva-
tization is strongly correlated with increases in prices of fixed-line, together
with decreases in fixed-line penetration and labor efficiency. In resource
scarce landlocked countries, privatization resulted on a significant and nega-
tive impact on fixed-line labor efficiency. Finally, in resource scarce coastal
countries instead, privatization is correlated significantly and positively both
with prices of the fixed-line operator and with labor efficiency.
In terms of the cellular sector, privatization and cellular penetration are
strong complements with the African resource rich and resource scarce coastal
samples, while these variables are substitutes in the Africa resource scarce
landlocked sample. In addition, in neither African sample there is a signifi-
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cant impact of privatization on prices of cellular.
To summarize, our analysis suggests there exists a strong relationship
between privatization of the fixed-line operator and sector outcomes, par-
ticularly for fixed-line prices, fixed-line labor efficiency and cellular deploy-
ment. The impact of privatization is non significant on the price of cellular
and weak on fixed-line deployment. When comparing across regions, pri-
vatization’s impact on outcomes is significantly positive in OECD countries
(fixed-line labor efficiency) and African resource scarce coastal (fixed-line la-
bor efficiency, cellular deployment), weakly positive in Latin America and
the Caribbean countries (fixed-line labor efficiency) and strongly negative
in African resource rich countries (fixed-line labor efficiency, fixed-line de-
ployment) and African resource scarce landlocked countries (fixed-line labor
efficiency, cellular deployment).
5 Conclusion
This paper has sought to contribute to the debate on the impact of the
privatization of the fixed-line operator on telecommunications outcomes. Our
work suggests that the divergent results in the empirical literature on the
performance of the privatization reform can be explained to a large extent
by cross-regional heterogeneity. In particular, our results are remarkably
different when considering comparable samples of OECD, Latin America
and the Caribbean, African resource rich, African resource scarce coastal,
and African resource scarce landlocked countries.
We find that the impact of privatization on outcomes is significant and
positive in OECD and African resource scarce coastal countries. In the sam-
ple of OECD countries, privatization is positively correlated with fixed-line
labor efficiency but has no impact on any other outcome variable. In the
sample of African resource scarce coastal countries, privatization is positively
correlated with fixed-line labor efficiency, fixed-line prices, and cellular de-
ployment. Rises in fixed-line residential prices to re-balance subsidized tariffs
have not translated into larger fixed-line deployment however.
The impact of privatization on outcomes is weakly positive in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean countries. In this sample, privatization is weakly cor-
related with increases in fixed-line labor efficiency and fixed-line prices. The
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impact of privatization is instead strongly negative in African resource rich
and African resource scarce landlocked countries. In the sample of African
resource rich countries, privatization results on lower fixed-line labor effi-
ciency, higher fixed-line residential prices, and lower fixed-line deployment.
The impact of privatization has been the worst in these countries. In the
sample of African resource scarce landlocked countries, privatization leads to
lower fixed-line labor efficiency and lower cellular deployment.
In our results, we find therefore no significant effects of privatization on
fixed-line network expansion in OECD countries consistent with the extent
to which there was excess supply at the time of privatization. Privatization
reform in non-OECD countries, where fixed-line networks where scarcely de-
veloped, has not led however to fixed-line network expansion. Even if one
of the reasons put forward by governments to privatize is to increase effi-
ciency, with our data this is only the case for OECD and African resource
scarce coastal countries. Residential prices of fixed-line increased with priva-
tization only in African countries which lagged behind their counterparts in
re-balancing subsidized tariffs.
The results presented in this paper for the case of telecommunications
thus challenge the idea that there is unique model of reform for infrastruc-
ture sectors that is equally applicable across regions and countries. Privati-
zation entails providing incentives for private actors to commit to long-term
investment. The empirical results obtained in this study suggest that sector
and economy-wide factors in a country are key factors in attracting capital
and that these in turn are important determinants of the success or failure
of privatization programs.
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Appendix
• Data
The data set constructed for this study contains observations for the
period 1985-2007 on the following list of countries:
- OECD countries (23): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United
States.
- Latin America and the Caribbean (25): Argentina, Bahamas, Bar-
bados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.
- Africa (43): Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Bu-
rundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Republic of Congo, Coˆte
d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mau-
ritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo,
Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
- Middle East (6): Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria
and United Arab Emirates.
- Asia and Pacific (11): Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, In-
donesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and
Vietnam.
We have collected data on variables regrouped in five categories: Telecom-
munications outcomes, Telecommunications reforms, Political and risk
indices, and Other variables. The definition of these variables and the
data sources are given below.
18
Telecommunications outcomes
Variable Source(s)
Output
• Mainline penetration -ITU
• Cellular subscription -ITU
Efficiency
• Mainlines per employee -ITU
Price
• Monthly subscription to fixed -ITU
• Price of cellular -ITU
Telecommunications reforms
Variable Source(s)
• Privatization -Various authors (Ros, 1999, 2003, Bortolotti
et al., 2001, McNary, 2001, Li and Xu, 2004,
Fink et al., 2002).
-ITU World Telecommunications Regulatory
database.
-Operators and regulators websites.
-Clark et al. (2004).
-Private Partcipation in Infrastructure (PPI)
Project World Bank database.
-IPANeT Privatization Transactions
database (World Bank).
• Competition in cellular -Various authors (Ros, 1999, 2003, Bortolotti
et al., 2001, McNary, 2001, Li and Xu, 2004,
Fink et al., 2002).
-Trends in Telecommunication Reform 1999:
Convergence and Regulation. ITU.
-ITU World Telecommunications Regulatory
database.
-Operators and regulatory authorities web-
sites.
-Clark et al. (2004).
-http://www.gsmworld.com.
• Creation of a regulatory
agency
-Trends in Telecommunication Reform 1999:
Convergence and Regulation. ITU.
-ITU World Telecommunications Regulatory
database.
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Political and risk indices
Variable Source(s)
• Democratic accountability -International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) risk ratings
• Political risk -Idem
• Financial risk -Idem
• Economic risk -Idem
Other variables
Variable Source(s)
• Rural population -World Bank Indicators
• GDP per capita -World Bank Indicators
• Africa resource rich -Bates et al. (2008)
• Africa resource scarce coastal -Idem
• Africa resource scarce landlocked -Idem
Telecommunications outcomes
- Output
. Mainline penetration: Number of telephone lines per 100 in-
habitants that connect the subscribers’ terminal equipment
to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN).
. Cellular subscription: Number of users of portable telephones
subscribing to a mobile telephone service with access to the
PSTN.
- Efficiency
. Mainlines per employee: Number of mainlines per employee
in the fixed service activity.
- Price
. Monthly subscription to fixed: Recurring fixed charge (in 2000
US dollars) paid by residential subscribers to the PSTN. This
charge covers only the rental of the line, not that of the ter-
minal.
. Price of cellular: Price (in 2000 US dollars) paid for a 3-minute
call during peak hours from a cellular telephone. For reasons
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of inter-country comparability, this price corresponds to that
of a call placed with a pre-paid card.
Telecommunications reforms
- Privatization: Dichotomous variable which takes on the value 1 if
the assets of the incumbent have been partly (or totally) sold to
private investors, and 0 if the incumbent is State-owned.
- Competition in cellular: Dichotomous variable with value 1 if
there is more than one operator in the cellular segment (analogue
and digital), and 0 if this segment is a monopoly.
- Creation of a regulatory agency: Dichotomous variable which
takes on the value 1 if a regulatory agency exists and is sepa-
rated from and not directly controlled by a ministry or a utility,
and 0 otherwise.
Political and risk indices
- Democratic accountability: This variable, in the range between
0-6, is a measure of how responsive government is to its people,
on the basis that the less responsive it is, the more likely it is that
the government will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but
possibly violently in a non-democratic one.
- Political risk: Composite variable that includes 12 weighted vari-
ables covering both political and social attributes. The values of
this risk index are in the range 0-100. Higher values of this index
reflect low risk.
- Financial risk: Composite variable that includes 5 variables that
measure ratios of the national financial structure. The values of
this risk index are in the range 0-50. Higher values of this index
reflect low risk.
- Economic risk: Composite variable that includes 5 variables that
measure ratios of the national economic structure. The values of
this risk index are in the range 0-50. Higher values of this index
reflect low risk.
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Other variables
- Rural population: Variable that indicates the percentage of the
total population that resides in rural areas.
- GDP per capita: Gross Domestic Product per capita measured in
constant 2000 USD.
- Africa resource rich: Dichotomous variable which takes on the
value 1 if the country is African resource rich, and 0 otherwise.
- Africa resource scarce coastal: Dichotomous variable which takes
on the value 1 if the country is African resource scarce coastal,
and 0 otherwise.
- Africa resource scarce landlocked: Dichotomous variable which
takes on the value 1 if the country is African resource scarce land-
locked, and 0 otherwise.
Table A1
Africa: Classification
Variable Designation Countries
dummy rr Africa resource rich Angola, Botswana, Cameroon,
Republic of Congo, Zambia
Gabon, Guinea, Equatorial
Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Nige-
ria, Sierra Leone, Swaziland,
Algeria and Tunisia.
dummy rsc Africa resource scarce
coastal
Coˆte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya,
Tanzania, South Africa, Mo-
rocco, Benin, Cape Verde, Gam-
bia, Madagascar, Mozambique,
Mauritius, Senegal, Seychelles,
Togo and Egypt.
dummy rsl Africa resource scarce
landlocked
Malawi, Uganda, Burundi, Burk-
ina Faso, Central African Re-
public, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mali,
Malawi, Niger, Chad, Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo and
Zimbabwe.
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• Descriptive statistics
Table A2
Summary statistics: OECD countries
Variable Designation Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ml Mainline penetration 528 49.95 10.52 14.52 74.19
cel Cellular subscription 526 35.35 39.87 0 135.14
eff Mainlines per employee 486 181.82 67.66 43.48 526.20
p res Monthly subscription to fixed 414 14.91 4.58 5.55 26.47
p cel Price of cellular 293 1.31 0.76 0.11 5.64
priva Privatization 552 0.57 0.49 0 1
comp cel Competition in cellular 552 0.59 0.49 0 1
reg Creation of a regulatory agency 552 0.53 0.49 0 1
demo Democratic accountability 547 5.71 0.56 3 6
p risk Political risk 522 66.09 14.15 29.16 94.41
f risk Financial risk 547 41.92 5.11 25.66 50
e risk Economic risk 547 39.76 3.50 25.83 48.41
rural Rural population 552 25.20 11.07 2.64 54.70
gdp GDP per capita 552 23,253.82 8,674.32 6,423.80 56,189.02
Table A3
Summary statistics: non-OECD countries
Variable Designation Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ml Mainline penetration 1993 6.08 8.13 0.03 50.14
cel Cellular subscription 2009 7.64 17.26 0 173.37
eff Mainlines per employee 1658 66.77 68.39 1.10 564.30
p res Monthly subscription to fixed 1322 8.17 11.07 0.23 135.59
p cel Price of cellular 843 0.85 1.24 0.12 23.65
priva Privatization 2112 0.30 0.46 0 1
comp cel Competition in cellular 2136 0.46 0.49 0 1
reg Creation of a regulatory agency 2136 0.39 0.48 0 1
demo Democratic accountability 1771 3.23 1.35 0 6
p risk Political risk 1770 57.11 12.07 9.58 86.41
f risk Financial risk 1770 30.68 8.10 6.5 49
e risk Economic risk 1770 31.47 6.44 1.37 48.00
rural Rural population 2127 55.45 21.34 6.68 94.80
gdp GDP per capita 2076 2,135.67 3,344.51 62.23 29,268.68
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Table A4
Summary statistics: Latin America and the Caribbean
Variable Designation Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ml Mainline penetration 588 11.43 9.77 0.52 50.14
cel Cellular subscription 588 11.01 20.13 0 112.89
eff Mainlines per employee 495 102.74 85.44 13.23 564.30
p res Monthly subscription to fixed 365 8.38 12.73 0.23 135.59
p cel Price of cellular 242 1.11 1.89 0.02 23.65
priva Privatization 600 0.39 0.48 0 1
comp cel Competition in cellular 624 0.44 0.49 0 1
reg Creation of a regulatory agency 624 0.45 0.49 0 1
demo Democratic accountability 576 3.80 1.29 0 6
p risk Political risk 576 60.31 11.94 23.08 86.41
f risk Financial risk 576 31.55 7.92 6.5 45.67
e risk Economic risk 576 31.20 6.16 1.37 44.04
rural Rural population 624 38.66 17.47 6.68 76.70
gdp GDP per capita 594 3,488.00 3,262.03 402.01 17,353.78
Table A5
Summary statistics: Africa
Variable Designation Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ml Mainline penetration 995 2.51 4.61 0.41 28.71
cel Cellular subscription 1071 4.82 12.69 0 89.22
eff Mainlines per employee 808 40.62 35.37 3.81 218.71
p res Monthly subscription to fixed 679 8.30 11.13 0.25 85.49
p cel Price of cellular 395 0.82 0.74 0.04 6.08
priva Privatization 1071 0.26 0.43 0 1
comp cel Competition in cellular 1071 0.43 0.49 0 1
reg Creation of a regulatory agency 1071 0.38 0.48 0 1
demo Democratic accountability 826 2.92 1.17 0 5.5
p risk Political risk 826 54.74 11.42 9.83 79.83
f risk Financial risk 826 28.79 7.57 9.83 79.83
e risk Economic risk 826 30.43 6.67 5.33 45.25
rural Rural population 1071 65.09 15.30 14.96 94.80
gdp GDP per capita 1065 978.27 1,414.66 62.23 8, 692.03
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Table A6
Summary statistics: Africa resource rich
Variable Designation Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ml Mainline penetration 327 2.24 2.66 0.05 12.46
cel Cellular subscription 336 5.57 13.72 0 87.85
eff Mainlines per employee 246 40.06 31.04 3.81 149.10
p res Monthly subscription to fixed 209 6.47 8.51 0.25 60.54
p cel Price of cellular 117 0.81 0.71 0.04 4.36
priva Privatization 360 0.33 0.47 0 1
comp cel Competition in cellular 360 0.37 0.48 0 1
reg Creation of a regulatory agency 360 0.28 0.45 0 1
demo Democratic accountability 307 2.84 1.10 0 5.5
p risk Political risk 307 54.33 13.10 9.83 79.83
f risk Financial risk 307 28.76 9.39 8.00 49.00
e risk Economic risk 307 32.01 7.31 7.37 45.25
rural Rural population 360 56.92 14.39 14.96 78.20
gdp GDP per capita 360 1,362.29 1,454.73 62.23 8,692.03
Table A7
Summary statistics: Africa resource scarce coastal
Variable Designation Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ml Mainline penetration 378 4.27 6.60 0.22 28.71
cel Cellular subscription 382 6.94 15.50 0 89.22
eff Mainlines per employee 331 51.14 42.30 6.41 218.71
p res Monthly subscription to fixed 247 7.96 11.31 0.27 85.45
p cel Price of cellular 145 0.74 0.63 0.08 3.89
priva Privatization 408 0.29 0.45 0 1
comp cel Competition in cellular 408 0.52 0.50 0 1
reg Creation of a regulatory agency 408 0.44 0.49 0 1
demo Democratic accountability 312 3.23 1.16 1 5.5
p risk Political risk 311 58.45 8.27 36 74.50
f risk Financial risk 311 30.86 5.78 17.87 42.25
e risk Economic risk 311 30.50 5.99 5.33 39.54
rural Rural population 399 60.76 11.21 39.26 83.30
gdp GDP per capita 395 1,216.88 1,679.06 139.92 8,267.39
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Table A8
Summary statistics: Africa resource scarce landlocked
Variable Designation Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ml Mainline penetration 290 0.51 0.55 0.04 2.96
cel Cellular subscription 296 1.24 3.08 0 22.71
eff Mainlines per employee 239 25.90 20.34 4.65 178.97
p res Monthly subscription to fixed 223 10.41 12.69 0.49 77.85
p cel Price of cellular 133 0.93 0.86 0.07 6.08
priva Privatization 312 0.12 0.33 0 1
comp cel Competition in cellular 312 0.40 0.49 0 1
reg Creation of a regulatory agency 312 0.41 0.49 0 1
demo Democratic accountability 216 2.57 1.16 0.66 5
p risk Political risk 216 50.30 10.97 21.75 75.00
f risk Financial risk 216 25.93 5.66 11.08 40.50
e risk Economic risk 216 28.02 5.88 8.16 36.75
rural Rural population 312 80.07 8.87 61.42 94.80
gdp GDP per capita 309 225.08 128.60 81.00 680.45
Table A9
Correlation coefficients
Privatization ml cel eff p res p cel
OECD 0.08 0.48 0.30 0.07 -0.21
Non-OECD 0.19 0.25 0.20 0.10 -0.03
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.08 0.19 0.18 0.22 -0.03
Africa 0.26 0.35 0.30 0.05 -0.12
Africa resource rich 0.48 0.35 0.45 0.42 -0.17
Africa resource scarce coastal 0.12 0.30 0.11 0.10 -0.04
Africa resource scarce landlocked 0.08 0.33 0.22 0.07 -0.13
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• Regressions
Table A10
Fixed-effect: OECD countries
yit log(mlit) log(celit) log(effit)
privait 0.007 -0.022 0.064∗
comp celit 0.024 0.180∗∗∗ 0.026
regit 0.042∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.066∗
demoit 0.086∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.034
p riskit 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.011∗∗∗
f riskit 0.002 0.013∗∗ -0.002
e riskit -0.008∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗
ruralit -0.001 -0.000 -0.046∗∗∗
gdpit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗
const 3.081∗∗∗ 0.105 5.151∗∗∗
Time Yes Yes Yes
F 34.67∗∗∗ 541.60∗∗∗ 42.26∗∗∗
Obs. 494 492 453
yit log(p resit) log(p celit)
privait -0.032 -0.029
comp celit 0.093∗∗∗ -0.121
regit 0.054∗ 0.004
demoit -0.121∗∗∗ -0.027
p riskit -0.000 -0.005
f riskit -0.009∗∗ -0.005
e riskit 0.005 0.008
ruralit 0.023∗∗∗ 0.051
gdpit 0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
const 2.415∗∗∗ 1.469
Time Yes No
F 8.86∗∗∗ 16.75∗∗∗
Obs. 391 276
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ stands for significance at the 10%/5%/1%.
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Table A11
Random-effect: OECD countries
yit log(mlit) log(celit) log(effit)
privait 0.007 -0.028 0.095∗∗∗
comp celit 0.023 0.187∗∗∗ 0.043
regit 0.042∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗
demoit 0.087∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.037
p riskit 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.011∗∗∗
f riskit 0.002 0.012∗∗ -0.003
e riskit -0.008∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ 0.006
ruralit -0.003 -0.000 -0.010∗∗
gdpit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000
const 3.110∗∗∗ -0.182 4.224∗∗∗
Time Yes Yes No
Wald 111.97∗∗∗ 16670.20∗∗∗ 328.80∗∗∗
Obs. 494 492 453
yit log(p resit) log(p celit)
privait -0.032 -0.135
comp celit 0.087∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗
regit 0.052∗ -0.122
demoit -0.122∗∗∗ -0.101
p riskit -0.000 -0.002
f riskit -0.008∗∗ 0.010
e riskit 0.009∗ 0.005
ruralit 0.010∗ -0.003
gdpit 0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
const 2.667∗∗∗ 1.743∗
Time Yes No
Wald 275.98∗∗∗ 135.86∗∗∗
Obs. 391 276
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ stands for significance at the 10%/5%/1%.
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Table A12
Fixed-effect: non-OECD countries
yit log(mlit) log(celit) log(effit)
privait 0.007 0.054 -0.013
comp celit 0.064∗ 0.060 0.148∗∗∗
regit -0.116∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗
demoit -0.050∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
p riskit 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.000
f riskit 0.010∗∗∗ -0.002 0.006∗∗
e riskit -0.000∗∗∗ -0.002 0.000
ruralit -0.001 -0.023∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
gdpit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
const -0.263 0.681∗∗ 1.880∗∗∗
Time Yes Yes Yes
F 86.11∗∗∗ 392.73∗∗∗ 98.22∗∗∗
Obs. 1601 1606 1342
yit log(p resit) log(p celit)
privait 0.372∗∗∗ -0.141
comp celit 0.089 -0.234∗∗
regit 0.180∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗
demoit -0.073∗∗∗ -0.046
p riskit 0.003 0.002
f riskit -0.012∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
e riskit 0.010∗ -0.000
ruralit 0.019∗ -0.097∗∗∗
gdpit 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
const 1.454 -4.442∗∗∗
Time Yes No
F 26.20∗∗∗ 21.03∗∗∗
Obs. 1086 710
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ stands for significance at the 10%/5%/1%.
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Table A13
Random-effect: non-OECD countries
yit log(mlit) log(celit) log(effit)
privait -0.001 0.068∗ -0.023
comp celit 0.062∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
regit -0.108∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ -0.077∗∗
demoit -0.040∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
p riskit 0.001 0.007∗∗ -0.000
f riskit 0.011∗∗∗ 0.000 0.006∗∗
e riskit 0.001 -0.002 0.002
ruralit -0.018∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
gdpit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
const 0.633∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗ 3.286∗∗∗
Time Yes Yes Yes
Wald 2695.73∗∗∗ 10520.32∗∗∗ 2902.47∗∗∗
Obs. 1601 1606 1342
yit log(p resit) log(p celit)
privait 0.377∗∗∗ -0.111
comp celit 0.045 -0.450∗∗∗
regit 0.202∗∗∗ -0.372∗∗∗
demoit -0.078∗∗∗ -0.032
p riskit 0.009∗∗ 0.007
f riskit -0.018∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
e riskit 0.006 -0.001
ruralit 0.011∗∗∗ 0.036
gdpit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
const 2.592∗∗∗ 0.705
Time Yes No
Wald 751.12∗∗∗ 142.51∗∗∗
Obs. 1086 710
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ stands for significance at the 10%/5%/1%.
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Table A14
Fixed-effect:
Latin American and The Caribbean
yit log(mlit) log(celit) log(effit)
privait 0.043 -0.016 0.001
comp celit 0.136∗∗∗ 0.073 0.201∗∗∗
regit 0.073∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗
demoit 0.009 -0.0318 -0.035
p riskit 0.003 -0.006∗ 0.009
f riskit 0.004∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.000∗∗
e riskit -0.000 -0.001 0.009∗
ruralit 0.032∗∗∗ -0.015∗ 0.087∗∗∗
gdpit -0.611∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
const 0.852∗∗∗ -0.812∗∗ 1.024∗∗
Time Yes Yes Yes
F 108.34∗∗∗ 365.80∗∗∗ 48.94∗∗∗
Obs. 498 497 423
yit log(p resit) log(p celit)
privait 0.297 -0.327
comp celit -0.286∗ 0.047
regit -0.081 0.170
demoit -0.201∗∗∗ -0.106
p riskit 0.001 0.008
f riskit -0.033∗∗∗ -0.012
e riskit -0.004 -0.001
ruralit 0.023 -0.134∗∗∗
gdpit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
const 1.705 1.667
Time No Yes
F 8.35∗∗∗ 12.73∗∗∗
Obs. 318 217
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ stands for significance at the 10%/5%/1%.
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Table A15
Random-effect:
Latin American and The Caribbean
yit log(mlit) log(celit) log(effit)
privait 0.014 -0.094∗ 0.130∗∗
comp celit 0.075∗∗ 0.086 0.328∗∗∗
regit 0.083∗∗ 0.114∗ 0.124
demoit 0.017 -0.039 0.089∗∗
p riskit 0.004∗∗ 0.003 0.021∗∗∗
f riskit 0.002 -0.015∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗
e riskit 0.005∗ 0.007∗ 0.022∗∗∗
ruralit -0.004 -0.006∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
gdpit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
const 0.672 0.262 3.150∗∗∗
Time Yes Yes Yes
Wald 2590.59 10264.91∗∗∗ 753.72∗∗∗
Obs. 498 497 423
yit log(p resit) log(p celit)
privait 0.336∗∗ -0.144
comp celit -0.421∗∗∗ -0.231
regit -0.019 -0.082
demoit -0.165∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗
p riskit 0.006 0.043∗∗∗
f riskit -0.042∗∗∗ -0.017
e riskit 0.000 -0.001
ruralit -0.001 -0.009∗
gdpit 0.000 0.000
const 3.411∗∗∗ -1.181
Time Yes
Wald 72.79∗∗∗ 243.42∗∗∗
Obs. 318 217
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ stands for significance at the 10%/5%/1%.
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Table A16
Fixed-effect: Africa
yit log(mlit) log(celit) log(effit)
privait -0.118∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗
comp celit -0.027 0.143∗∗ 0.078∗
regit 0.114∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.031
demoit 0.017 -0.090∗∗∗ -0.010
p riskit -0.003 0.000 -0.006∗∗∗
f riskit 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002 0.008∗∗
e riskit 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
ruralit -0.011∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ 0.002
gdpit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
const -0.265 1.865∗∗∗ 2.383∗∗∗
Time Yes Yes Yes
F 33.40∗∗∗ 173.77∗∗∗ 39.58∗∗∗
Obs. 764 774 626
yit log(p resit) log(p celit)
privait 0.413∗∗∗ 0.209
comp celit 0.095 -0.119
regit 0.098 -0.447∗∗∗
demoit -0.067∗∗ 0.038
p riskit 0.001 -0.007
f riskit -0.018∗∗ -0.016
e riskit 0.015∗∗ 0.002
ruralit 0.028 0.102∗∗∗
gdpit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
const 0.838 -6.099∗∗
Time Yes No
F 18.32∗∗∗ 9.82∗∗∗
Obs. 529 312
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ stands for significance at the 10%/5%/1%.
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Table A17
Random-effect: Africa
yit log(mlit) log(celit) log(effit)
privait -0.119∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗
comp celit -0.022 0.135∗∗ 0.083∗
regit 0.113∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.0340
demoit 0.020 -0.089∗∗∗ -0.014
p riskit -0.003 0.004∗ -0.005∗∗
f riskit 0.004 0.006 0.010∗∗∗
e riskit 0.001 -0.004 -0.001
ruralit -0.014∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ 0.000
gdpit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
const -0.265 0.254 2.501∗∗∗
Time Yes Yes Yes
Wald 1083.36∗∗∗ 5182.54∗∗∗ 1232.24∗∗∗
Obs. 764 774 626
yit log(p resit) log(p celit)
privait 0.430∗∗∗ 0.096
comp celit 0.070 -0.273∗∗
regit 0.131 -0.505∗∗∗
demoit -0.080∗∗ 0.016
p riskit 0.004 -0.003
f riskit -0.018∗∗ -0.025
e riskit 0.014∗∗ 0.006
ruralit 0.028∗∗∗ 0.014∗
gdpit 0.000∗∗ 0.000
const 0.747 -0.299
Time Yes No
Wald 532.27∗∗∗ 72.00∗∗∗
Obs. 529 312
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ stands for significance at the 10%/5%/1%.
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Table A18
Fixed-effect: Africa per region
yit log(mlit) log(celit) log(effit)
privait ∗ dummy rr -0.305∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
privait ∗ dummy rsc 0.027 0.364∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
privait ∗ dummy rsl -0.066 -0.342∗∗∗ -0.686∗∗
comp celit -0.037 0.135∗∗ 0.051
regit 0.087∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.063
demoit 0.015 -0.085∗∗∗ 0.000
p riskit -0.004∗∗ 0.001 -0.008∗∗∗
f riskit 0.006∗∗ 0.002 0.012∗∗∗
e riskit -0.000 -0.002 -0.002
ruralit -0.014∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ 0.008
gdpit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
const 0.062 1.177∗∗ 1.913∗∗∗
Time Yes Yes Yes
F 32.59∗∗∗ 171.69∗∗∗ 43.66∗∗∗
Obs. 764 774 626
yit log(p resit) log(p celit)
privait ∗ dummy rr 0.261∗ 0.339
privait ∗ dummy rsc 0.790∗∗∗ 0.207
privait ∗ dummy rsl 0.094 0.007
comp celit 0.104 -0.115
regit 0.100 -0.416∗∗∗
demoit -0.067∗∗ 0.016
p riskit 0.002 -0.007
f riskit -0.014∗ -0.015
e riskit 0.013∗∗ 0.002
ruralit 0.037∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
gdpit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
const 0.144 -6.595∗∗
Time Yes No
F 17.98∗∗∗ 8.06∗∗∗
Obs. 529 312
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ stands for significance at the 10%/5%/1%.
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Table A19
Random-effect: Africa per region
yit log(mlit) log(celit) log(effit)
privait ∗ dummy rr -0.308∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗
privait ∗ dummy rsc 0.029 0.415∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
privait ∗ dummy rsl -0.067 -0.352∗∗∗ -0.686∗∗∗
comp celit -0.033 0.127∗∗ 0.056
regit 0.086∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.069
demoit 0.017 -0.078∗∗∗ -0.003
p riskit -0.004∗ 0.003 -0.007∗∗∗
f riskit 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.013∗∗∗
e riskit 0.000 -0.004 -0.002
ruralit -0.016∗∗∗ -0.001 0.006
gdpit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
const 0.032 -0.078 2.077∗∗∗
Time Yes Yes Yes
Wald 1125.58∗∗∗ 5462.79∗∗∗ 1459.11∗∗∗
Obs. 764 774 626
yit log(p resit) log(p celit)
privait ∗ dummy rr 0.257∗∗ 0.162
privait ∗ dummy rsc 0.796∗∗∗ 0.057
privait ∗ dummy rsl 0.104 0.072
comp celit 0.080 -0.270∗∗
regit 0.119 -0.505∗∗∗
demoit -0.077∗∗ 0.017
p riskit 0.004 -0.003
f riskit -0.014∗∗ -0.026∗∗
e riskit 0.012∗ 0.006
ruralit 0.033∗∗∗ 0.015∗
gdpit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
const 0.277 -0.334
Time Yes No
Wald 566.71∗∗∗ 72.65∗∗∗
Obs. 529 312
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ stands for significance at the 10%/5%/1%.
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